Formal and informal Patronage among Jews in the Islamic East: evidence from the Cairo Geniza by Rustow, Marina
AL-QANARA
XXIX 2, julio-diciembre de 2008
pp. 341-382
ISSN 0211-3589
FORMAL AND INFORMAL PATRONAGE AMONG
JEWS IN THE ISLAMIC EAST: EVIDENCE FROM
THE CAIRO GENIZA
MECENAZGO FORMAL E INFORMAL ENTRE JUDÍOS
EN EL MUNDO ISLÁMICO ORIENTAL: ALGUNOS
EJEMPLOS DE LA GENIZA DE EL CAIRO
MARINA RUSTOW
Emory University
This paper investigates the political culture
of the Islamic East under Fatimid and
Buwayhid rule (tenth-twelfth centuries) via
relationships between patrons, clients,
protégés, and partners. The main body of evi-
dence I utilize are letters and petitions from
the Cairo Geniza that employ the same spe-
cialized vocabulary of patron-client relation-
ships one finds in Arabic histories of the pe-
riod: idioms referring to the exchange of
benefit, reciprocal service, protection, over-
sight, patronage, and loyalty. The Geniza let-
ters, written without regard for posterity, sug-
gest that these idioms were used well beyond
the courts and were understood and deployed
by men and women, the literate and illiterate,
the important and the inconsequential. Yet
the use of certain terms in Judaeo-Arabic also
differs from their use in Arabic: some reflect
devaluation over time, while others hardened
into formulaic phrases. These differences
suggest that some forms of patronage did not
thrive beyond the hothouse of the court;
viewed from another perspective, they also
suggest that even outside courtly literature,
one can retrieve fossils of older forms of pa-
tronage in the terms used to describe relation-
ships between leaders and their followers as
well as among people more nearly equal in
station. A society’s use of social metaphors
reveals something of what its members
value, what they choose to retain and perpet-
uate from the past, how they function in mo-
ments of crisis, and how successfully their
rulers have managed to convince them of the
Este artículo aborda la cultura política del
Oriente islámico bajo gobierno fatimí y bu-
wayhí (siglos X al XII) a partir de las relacio-
nes entre mecenas, clientes, protegidos y so-
cios. Se centra en el análisis de cartas y
peticiones de la Geniza de El Cairo que usan
el mismo vocabulario especializado que las
fuentes árabes históricas de la época a la hora
de describir las relaciones entre patrón y
cliente: expresiones que hacen referencia al
intercambio de beneficios, servicios recíprocos,
protección, supervisión, patronazgo y lealtad.
Las cartas de la Geniza, escritas sin ningún
afán de pasar a la historia, sugieren que esas
expresiones circulaban fuera del contexto
cortesano y que hombres y mujeres, letrados
y analfabetos, gentes de alto y bajo rango, las
entendían y las usaban. Aun así, el uso de
ciertos términos en judeo-árabe y en árabe di-
fiere: algunos términos parecen haber experi-
mentado cierta erosión, mientras que otros
parecen haberse convertido en meras fórmu-
las. Esas diferencias indican que algunas for-
mas de patronazgo no prosperaron más allá
del entorno puramente cortesano; por otro
lado, también indican que se pueden encon-
trar antiguas formas de patronazgo fosiliza-
das en términos usados para describir las rela-
ciones entre los líderes y sus seguidores, o
entre gente de categorías sociales más próxi-
mas, incluso fuera de la literatura cortesana.
El uso que una sociedad hace de las metá-
foras sociales pone de manifiesto lo que
sus miembros valoran, los aspectos del pa-
sado que deciden conservar y perpetuar, elScholarship on the political culture of the Islamic East under
Abbasid-Buwayhid rule has noted the pervasiveness of patron-client
relationships, seemingly informal vertical alliances that substituted
for formal institutional structures binding courtiers to rulers and ar-
mies to the regimes they served. 1 But most of the evidence of courtly
life —chronicles, biographical dictionaries, belles lettres, treatises on
administration, and mirrors for princes— comes to us via literary
sources composed at court or under courtly patronage, a fact that
raises the question of whether those relationships were principally an
artefact of the writings in which they appeared. At court, one required
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legitimacy of the social and political order.
Conversely, the vocabulary of patronage was
a social technique that allowed Jews to con-
duct business, engage in politics and commu-
nal regulation, and to amass and retain fol-
lowers in a variety of spheres, including that
of the rabbinic academies who proffered the
construction of Judaism that became hege-
monic over the course of the Middle Ages.
Key words: Medieval Jews; Judeo-Arabic;
Cairo Geniza; Patronage; Etiquette.
modo en que funcionan en los momentos
de crisis y la capacidad que sus gobernantes
tienen de convencerles o no de la legitimidad
del orden político-social. A su vez, el voca-
bulario del patronazgo fue una técnica social
que permitió que los judíos llevaran sus ne-
gocios, tomaran parte activa en la normativa
política y comunitaria, y acumularan y retuvie-
ran seguidores en varias esferas distintas, in-
cluida la de las academias rabínicas, una es-
fera en la que se gestó el judaísmo medieval
hegemónico.
Palabras clave: Judíos en la Edad Media; ju-
deo-árabe; Geniza de El Cairo; patronazgo;
etiqueta.
1 Others have made similar observations about relationships between teachers and
their students and among long-distance traders during the same period over a greater
swath of territory. Goitein, S.D., “Formal Friendship in the Medieval Near East,” Procee-
dings of the American Philosophical Society, 115 (1971), 484-89; Mottahedeh, R.,
“Admistration in Buyid Qazwin,” in D.S. Richards (ed.), Islamic Civilisation 950-1150,
Oxford, 1973, 33-45; Udovitch, A.L., “Formalism and Informalism in the Social and
Economic Institutions of the Medieval Islamic World,” in A. Banani and S. Vryonis
(eds.), Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam, Wiesbaden, 1977, 61-81; Mot-
tahedeh, R., Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society, Princeton, 1980; Udo-
vitch, A.L., “Merchants and Amirs: Government and Trade in Eleventh-century Egypt,”
Asian and African Studies, 22 (1988), 53-72; Berkey, J.P., The Transmission of Knowled-
ge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education, Princeton, 1992; and
Ephrat, D., A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni ‘Ulam’ of Eleventh
Century Baghdad, Albany, 2000. This trend has not gone unchallenged: see, e.g., Petry,
C.F., “Educational Institutions as Depicted in the Biographical Literature of Mamluk
Cairo: The Debate over Prestige and Venue,” Medieval Prosopography, 23 (2002),
101-23; Stewart, D.J., “The Doctorate of Islamic Law in Mamluk Egypt and Syria,” in J.
Lowry, D.J. Stewart and S. Toorawa (eds.), Law and Education in Medieval Islam: Stu-
dies in Memory of George Makdisi, Cambridge, 2004, 45-90.patronage in order to survive. Did similar networks of ties of depend-
ency between the powerful and their protégés characterize life outside
the courts as well?
Patronage, clienthood, and detailed and reciprocal sets of obliga-
tions in social and political life did indeed extend beyond the courts
and into the circles of men and women of humbler rank. The purpose
of this article is to demonstrate this on the basis of personal letters
preserved in the Cairo Geniza that employ precisely the specialized
idioms of patron-client relationships that one finds in the courtly liter-
ature. The similarities between the courtly and documentary records
are striking and must be explained; the differences, too, are instruc-
tive. The similarities suggest either that Jews maintained contacts
with the court and read courtly literature, or that this shared lexicon of
patronage and loyalty functioned in a wider range of contexts than
has been previously supposed. There were, in fact, direct contacts be-
tween Jews and the caliphal courts of Baghdad and Cairo in the tenth,
eleventh, and twelfth centuries, in the form of courtiers, bureaucrats,
and Jewish communal leaders trained in the canons of Arabic diplo-
matic (insh’). In the present analysis, however, I lean toward the sec-
ond explanation: the parallels between courtly literature and everyday
letters demonstrate how deeply the modes and manners that we as-
cribe to courtly etiquette permeated other realms of relationships
whose stability rested on the binding power of loyalty. As to the dif-
ferences, the documentary sources suggest that in an era when the
pages of courtly literature were replete with metaphors of patronage,
in wider usage some of those metaphors had been transformed into
mere fossils, ossified remnants of the era of self-conscious patronage
preserved in the literary sources.
The texts I have examined are all private letters exchanged be-
tween individuals. Unlike the Greek and Latin letters of antiquity,
they were never intended for public consumption or recitation, and
were not transmitted or copied by anyone, save the occasional student
learning to write or young scribe practicing his craft. They were
strictly private pieces, discarded and rediscovered a millennium later,
and for that reason they offer a glimpse of how seriously people took
matters of patronage and loyalty when, unlike the court chroniclers,
they were not describing them for posterity or with some lofty literary
purpose in mind.
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arrangements governed the obligations between patrons and their
protégés, both parties to the relationship reminded one another of
those obligations in affective terms. Both Roy Mottahedeh and A.L.
Udovitch have noted this, contending that allies were more likely to
describe their duties and commitments toward one another as arising
from loyalty and gratitude for benefaction than in terms of the legal
requirements that bound them to one another; both have described a
particular mixture of formalism and informalism that governed social
and political relationships in the medieval Islamic East. 2 Mottahedeh,
while focusing on courtiers, hypothesized that sustained patronage
was “an important means of creating new ties on all levels of life;
and, undoubtedly,” he adds, “if we had more information on the low-
est levels of life, we would see it at work in the relations of landlords
to peasants and of grocers to sweepers.” 3 What he proffered as a
mere suspicion can, in fact, be demonstrated: the vocabulary of pa-
tronage functioned among the lower classes, and it functioned in con-
texts that were, at best, very loosely centralized, juridically undefined,
and for the most part entirely lacking in coercive mechanisms. At
court, one recited one’s part in the patron-client drama out of fear of
the frequently dire consequences, including but not limited to death,
that might follow on missed cues and political blunders; outside that
fraught and enclosed world, one played one’s role in consideration of
what Mottahedeh calls “the calculus of benefaction (ni‘ma),” a social
code, defined obliquely if at all, that regulated exchanges of benefit
and according to which one gave or received patronage. 4
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2 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 84; Udovitch, “Formalism and Informa-
lism;” but cf. now Lieberman, Ph., “A Partnership Culture: Jewish Economic and Social
Life Seen through the Legal Documents of the Cairo Geniza” (PhD dissertation, Prince-
ton, 2007), who argues against Udovitch that partnerships between traders were, in fact,
regulated by legal instruments and institutions and did not rest principally upon informal
or affective bonds. For a complementary argument on behalf of the blended uses of both
formal and informal strategies among traders, see Goldberg, J.L., “The Geographies of
Trade and Traders in the Eastern Mediterranean 1000-1150: A Geniza Study,” PhD dis-
sertation, Columbia, 2005, especially chapter 2.
3 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 90.
4 Ibidem, e.g., 82; alternately, “calculus of mutual liability,” 74.Patronage Formal and Informal
What, precisely, does the English word patronage mean, and is it
of any use in discussing Arabic sources?
Defined in the most general way possible, patronage entails using
one’s political power, financial means, or other types of influence to
advance one’s interests. The type of patronage with which most of the
essays in this volume are concerned led to the production of works of
art, literature, architecture, science, and philosophy via a relationship
in which the patron had a particular role to play, sometimes not just as
a supporter of culture but as a producer of it. 5 Patronage was a means
by which rulers and their courts advanced their claims as the
bestowers of material and cultural benefits on the populace; it was
both one of the unspoken obligations of kingship and a means by
which rulers achieved legitimacy —or the veneer of it— in the eyes
of their subjects. Even though, as Patricia Crone has recently noted,
none of the mirrors for princes states that rulers are obligated to mete
out fiscal support for cultural production, the benefits that caliphs,
sultans, viziers, and amrs accrued from doing so were tangible
enough to convince them to fund such endeavours, establish pious
foundations (awqf or abs) for them, and devote line-items to them
in the fiscal budget. 6
This type of patronage, however, is a subtype of the broader range
of courtly patronage, in which interests of all kinds were advanced
through the power and influence of those in the courtly hierarchy.
Those interests included narrowly political ones in which cultural
production played no part. Yet this sort of patronage, too, played a
role in legitimating regimes and rulers. An extreme instance of this,
as Crone has maintained, was the growing dependence of the
Abbasids on clientage, and in particular on the ranks of slave-soldiers
and other servile protectors of the regime; the dynasty used them, she
argues, as a desperate and last-ditch effort to augment its power in the
absence of convincing political meaning. 7 This kind of patronage too,
then, could serve the purposes of political legitimation.
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5 See especially Gruendler, B., Medieval Arabic Praise Poetry: Ibn al-Rumi and the
Patron’s Redemption, London and New York, 2003, 9-10.
6 Crone, P., God’s Rule: Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic
Political Thought, New York, 2004, 312-13.
7 Idem, Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity, Cambridge, 1980.The type of patronage with which Crone is concerned came to be
theorized by the jurists of the eighth century as wal’ —literally,
“proximity,” but more technically, patronage or clientage, a special
type of legal relationship that, in its early stages, allowed non-Arabs
to join the ranks of the Muslim umma despite their foreign origin. 8
By means of the formal patron-client bond, non-Arabian converts to
Islam assumed, through a form of fictive kinship, the benefits of alli-
ance with one of the Arab Muslim tribes —in theory, with the individ-
ual who had converted them; in practice, with the entire community
of believers— and in exchange, these converts were bound to provide
their patrons with services and, when they died, material bequests.
The institution of wal’ also extended to manumitted slaves, who be-
came the clients of their former owners. 9
During the early centuries of Islamic rule the institution of wal’
transformed almost beyond recognition, mainly as a result of the
Abbasid revolution, which extended the privileges formerly reserved
for Arabs to non-Arab Muslims. After the Abbasid rise to power,
wal’ was no longer a means of integrating non-Arabs into the ranks
of Islamic society, since they were already integrated; it came instead
to refer more strictly to the relationship between manumitters and
their former slaves. Those slaves’ descendants, however, were no lon-
ger considered clients (mawl): this type of patronage was not trans-
ferable by legacy, and the mawl never came to constitute an “eth-
nic” or otherwise hereditary group. That freed the wal’ arrangement
to serve other purposes. And indeed, the Abbasid rulers relied heavily
on their own clients in the formal sense of those whom they had per-
sonally manumitted and, perhaps, in the sense of those whom they
had “made” through favours and benefactions. Clients of the caliphal
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8 Crone, P., Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law: The Origins of the Islamic Patro-
nate, Cambridge, 1987, 91.
9 Ibidem (for an introduction to wal’ see chap. 3, and for its history, chap. 7); see
also idem in EI2, s.v. “Mawl.” For historical studies on the mawl as a class, see the es-
says collected in Bernards, M. and Nawas, J. (eds.), Patronate and Patronage in Early
Classical Islam, Leiden, 2005; for Sunn	 legal theory on wal’ and a partial revision of
Crone’s argument that the origins of wal’ lie in the koin of provincial law under Ro-
man rule, see Mitter, U., “Origin and Development of the Islamic Patronate,” in ibidem,
70-134; and for a radically skeptical reconsideration of the extent of wal’ as practiced
and its primacy as a form of conversion to Islam, see Bulliet, R.W., “Conversion-based
Patronage and Onomastic Evidence in Early Islam,” in ibidem, 246-62, an argument par-
tially anticipated in Crone, Slaves on Horses, 237 footnote 358.household came, in the late second and early third/ninth century, to
form a distinct group at court and to hold governorates and other high
ranking positions throughout the realm, as the high incidence of gov-
ernors and other local headsmen styled mawl amr al-mu’minn (cli-
ent of the commander of the faithful) attests. 10 Still others formed ar-
mies through a modified form of wal’ —the origins of the
slave-soldier institution that dominated the Near Eastern military be-
ginning in the second/ninth century and continued to do so up until
the nineteenth. 11
Here, the conundrum of whether and when to read an Arabic word
as a technical term has created some confusion. The term used to des-
ignate both the patron and the client in this institution —mawl— had
admitted of broader and informal uses at the top end, but was over
time loosened on the bottom end too, and used to refer not just to the
parties in the legal relationship of wal’, but to new kinds of patrons
and clients alike; hence it is not always clear in which sense a source
is calling someone a mawl. Over time, the term mawl came to be
used for patrons, benefactors, lords, and masters of all types, as the
specificity of the legal institution of wal’ gave way to a generalized
structure of hierarchy and dependency in which the court cultivated
clients because its own stability and safety depended on it. By the
eleventh century, the term mawl was used broadly, and it is abun-
dantly reflected in chancery petitions and private requests alike in
which the grandee of whom the request was made is styled a mawl
merely by virtue of being petitioned for something. An aphorism of
Ab l-‘Al’ al-Ma‘arr	 (973-1058) acknowledges this situation
obliquely: “If a person refrains from injuring me,” he writes, suggest-
ing that personal loyalty outweighs religious conviction, “/ Then he
will have bounty (suqy) and protection (ru’y) his entire life. // If he
wants, let him learn the book of Moses, / Or if he likes, let him be-
come a client (yu
miru wal’a) of Sha‘y” —the latter a reference to
a Jewish trading clan that was one of the most illustrious mercantile
Al-Qanara (AQ) XXIX 2, julio-diciembre 2008, pp. 341-382 ISSN 0211-3589
FORMAL AND INFORMAL PATRONAGE AMONG JEWS IN THE ISLAMIC EAST 347
10 Crone, Slaves on Horses, 67, and the examples cited there, 75, 78, 258 footnote
610, 259 footnote 616, and Appendix V, n.º 24, 29, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 45, 47, and 48.
There are likely to be numerous Egyptian mawl of this kind waiting to be found in
papyri; see, e.g., Austrian National Library, P. Vind. AP 762, recto, edited in Rustow,
M., “A Record of Obligation (dhikr aqq) Dated 242 AH (856-857),” in W. Diem, G.
Khan and P.M. Sijpesteijn (eds.), Arabische Urkunden, Berlin, forthcoming.
11 Crone, Slaves on Horses, 74-81; idem, “Mawl,” EI2.dynasties of the late eleventh century. If in the poet’s view even Jews
and traders could practice clientage, then surely the ties of wal’ had
come to mean something very different from the legal institution re-
flected in the work of the jurists. 12
One of the chief features of patronage in the later, looser sense
was the reciprocal nature of the obligations it entailed. The
amphibolous nature of the term mawl, which, at least in its origins,
could denote both patrons and clients, reflects the fact that the institu-
tion, by its nature, ascribed benefits and responsibilities to those on
both sides of the tie. Even after the term came to be used for lords
rather than their dependents, it was still widely understood that the
benefits and responsibilities exchanged on both sides created mutu-
ally obligatory bonds; and that those bonds were susceptible of rein-
forcement through verbal admonition, a subject about which I will
have more to say below.
Personal ties of clientage, then, were still pervasive and important
in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries; but they took on mean-
ings different from those they had borne in the two classical eras of
wal’, the Umayyad period with its basically tribal structure of
clientage ties, and the Abbasid period with its use of clientage as a
means of developing a vast network of retainers, one so vast that it ul-
timately took over the state itself in the form of the Buwayhids. But
while most agree on the importance of clientage, not all agree on how
to value the phenomenon. While Crone finds this new form of patron-
age that originated in the Abbasid crisis of political meaning in the
late second/eighth century to have been ultimately self-annihilating,
Mottahedeh views patronage in a very different mode, considering
the social meanings of the informal side of clientage in relations be-
tween the courts and their armies and secretaries as the regime foun-
dered. For Crone, the Abbasid dependence on clientage contained the
seeds of the regime’s decadence and, with the Buwayhid takeover of
Iraq and Iran in the fourth/tenth century, turned the house of Abbas
into fainéants (a term calqued from the Merovingian rois fainéants,
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12 Idh l-insnu kaffa l-sharra ‘ann / fa-suqy f l-ayti lahu wa-ru’y // Wa-yad-
rusu in arda kitba Ms / wa-yu
miru in aabba wal’a Sha‘y. Nicholson, R.A., Stu-
dies in Islamic Poetry, Cambridge, 1969, n.º 309, 284 (Arabic); cf. his English transla-
tion, 196. Goitein, S.D., A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab
World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, Berkeley, 1967-93, 3,10,
identifies this Sha‘y as a member of the Jewish mercantile family.“idle kings,” and indeed Crone compares the consolidation of the
Buwayhids and Seljuks with that of the Carolingians after the
Merovingian decline). 13 For Mottahedeh, by contrast, patronage
served as the main form of social coherence and political continuity
after the demise of Abbasid rule —as a kind of informal glue holding
society together in the absence of central or formal political institu-
tions. While Crone focuses on the formal institution of clientage; its
inadequacy and, finally, exhaustion as a means of politics; and its ulti-
mate responsibility for the mamlk institution, Mottahedeh focuses on
informal patronage among courtiers and ghilmn as holding the polit-
ical system in place. Ghilmn —slave boys whose dependence on
their patrons, frequently the caliph himself, began in childhood and
remained total even in adulthood— became the incarnation of
Abbasid fainéance; yet in Mottahedeh’s hands, the lesson of the
ghilmn is that the affective ties of men who rose together or made
their own clients could and did substitute for strong political institu-
tions. 14 These two arguments —in books published in the same
year— agree on the symptoms of Abbasid decadence, and even on
their causes. But while Crone’s is a sustained exercise in negative
judgment meant to explain the failure of the Abbasid polity and the
birth of a characteristically Islamic political institution, the slave-sol-
dier regime, Mottahedeh understands patronage in an anthropological
vein as a sign of resilience: as he puts it, “from the point of view of
the social historian, the weakness of government threw society back
on its own resources.” 15
Questions of judgment aside, Crone’s analysis stresses the formal
aspects of the arrangement while Mottahedeh focuses on the informal
ones. This difference reflects the fact that the word patronage refers to
at least three things in the context of medieval Islamicate courts and
societies: granting political and economic benefits in exchange for
cultural production; the formal legal institution of wal’; and more
broadly, the bonds of benefaction and dependence between all kinds
of patrons and clients. But all three types revolve around a common
ethos. It is that ethos that this article intends to describe, as evidenced
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13 Crone, Slaves on Horses, 82, 265 footnote 649.
14 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 84-89.
15 Ibidem, 39.by tenth-, eleventh- and twelfth-century sources of courtly and
non-courtly provenance.
Idioms of patronage
One characteristic of ties of patronage as they emerge in the
sources is that they came to be expressed in particular kinds of lan-
guage; language, in turn, took on particular characteristics when it ex-
pressed social values. While the vocabulary of patron-client relation-
ships dated back to the Umayyads and took on particular meaning
under the Abbasids, by the Buyid period it had begun to assume new
importance and even unprecedented meanings precisely because it
evoked long-dead institutions. The court and the bureaucracy held
themselves together partly out of a certain adherence to past forms
and idioms. This formalistic recycling of the linguistic structures of a
political life long past imbued idioms of patronage with double mean-
ing: they both referred to relationships in the present and invoked an
era when the Abbasids still ran their own court and the caliph was
more than a mere idler. One can even sense the gesture in the work of
Buwayhid historians such as al-Miskawayh (ca. 932-1030), whose
chronicle conjures up a dense and ultimately highly idealized picture
of court etiquette under the Abbasids, as if he was at pains to show
continuities with a past long past. He did this not in order to protect
the regime, of which he was openly critical in a way he could not
have been a century earlier, or to shore up its legitimacy, but because
(like Mottahedeh himself) he was possessed of a fascination with the
forms and gestures of social life.
Indeed, Mottahedeh’s anatomy of patronage is based principally
on Buyid chronicles by the likes of al-Miskawayh and Ab ayyn
al-Taw
	d	 (d. 1023), and one suspects that these two medieval au-
thors’ abiding interest in ethics and gossip respectively coloured
what they remembered and chose to represent of life at court. 16
Mottahedeh’s great contribution to understanding their work and that
of their contemporaries was to elucidate the relationship between lan-
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16 Ibidem; see especially 82-95, where he argues that the affective ties of iin‘ (pa-
tronage, fostering someone’s career) were more important than the legal ties of wal’ in
material from this period.guage and the social. Indeed, the chief interpretive problem the histo-
rian faces in reading Arabic sources, as Sauvaget and Cahen once put
it, is recognizing the “precise technical nuance in the meaning of a
word,” distinguishing technical from non-technical terms, or recog-
nizing when words bear worlds of meaning and when they do not. 17
At the Buwayhid court, terms describing political relationships con-
jured up vanished worlds. “There was an increasing rigidity in many
of the religiously sanctioned forms of proper public and private be-
haviour,” as Mottahedeh puts it. “In private life, these forms contin-
ued to be widely used for their original purposes. But in public life,
they were increasingly used not for their original purposes, but to in-
dicate the continued respect by the user for the private application of
Islamic forms.” 18 While some might question the neat distinction be-
tween public and private drawn here —the sources demonstrate the
two realms to have overlapped considerably— my research into the
forms and functions of social idioms in the Geniza corpus has con-
vinced me that some idioms of patronage retained their original vigor,
while others had been reduced to mere fossils. Yet the fossil record,
too, offers valuable clues to the context that produced the organisms
preserved there.
The adherence to the social and linguistic forms of patronage,
then, extended well beyond the Buwayhid courts of Baghdad, Shirz,
and Rayy. It would become a pervasive feature of social life in the
Fatimid realms of Egypt and Syria, and points West. It reached be-
yond the Buwayhid courtiers who consciously invoked Abbasid so-
cial forms even if they no longer existed in the same way; and it
reached beyond Muslims who, in using the terminology of wal’,
conjured up a body of law even if it was no longer practiced. It ap-
pears so widely in other sources from the eleventh century to the thir-
teenth that one must ask where the limits of the social forms of pa-
tronage lie. Among Muslims and at court, the long afterlife of
patronage relationships can be explained by the continuing need for
political meaning and social coherence, depending on whose reading
one follows. But that system came to encompass Jews and Christians
beyond the courts and beyond the Abbasid heartland as well.
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17 Sauvaget, J., Introduction to the History of the Muslim East: A Bibliographical
Guide, based on the 2nd ed. as recast by C. Cahen, Berkeley, 1965, 23.
18 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 27-28.To judge by the Geniza documents, non-Muslims adhered to the
detailed etiquette of these forms of patronage sincerely and unself-
consciously. From one perspective, there is nothing surprising in this.
Historians of the premodern age who have considered political rela-
tionships and social hierarchies in periods before the rise of the bu-
reaucratic, impersonal, and abstract state, from the Roman patronate
to feudalism, have frequently returned to the centrality of personal
ties in political life. 19 Yet each context expresses those ties and repre-
sents them differently. As the very different analyses of Crone and
Mottahedeh suggest, a society’s use of the vocabulary of patronage
reveals much about what it values, what it chooses to retain and per-
petuate from the past, how it functions in moments of crisis, how it
invites non-elite groups, or those who did not enjoy the privileges of
proximity to the palace, closer to the court, and how successfully it
manages to convince those non-elites of the legitimacy of the social
and political order. To judge by the Geniza sources, the Jews were
quite convinced.
As in the literature of the Buwayhid court, personal letters from
the Geniza consistently describe patrons and clients as exchanging
benefit (ni‘ma), service to one another (khidma), protection (ri‘ya,
‘inya), and nurturement (iin‘). These exchanges ideally provoke
feelings of gratitude (shukr), devotion (birr), sincerity of intent
(ikhl al-nya and usn al-nya), and loyalty (‘ahd, dhimm). Though
I have not, as yet, found evidence of Mottahedeh’s sweepers and gro-
cers using such metaphors, the Geniza corpus suggests that they were
nonetheless widely understood and deployed by men and women, the
literate and illiterate, courtiers, physicians, local leaders, judges, mer-
chants, paupers, and the scribes who wrote for them —by anyone, in
short, who asked for or received goods, services, or favours from any-
one else.
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19 See, e.g., two classic studies: Brown, P., Poverty and Leadership in the Later Ro-
man Empire, Hanover, 2002; Bloch, M., Feudal Society, L.A. Manyon (transl.), London,
1989 [1939-40].Benefaction and Thanks
One term in particular became the basic building block of the so-
cial system: ni‘ma, the benefits bestowed on someone out of bounty,
kindness, and providence. The prevalence and prominence of ni‘ma
in medieval Arabic literature and letters alike owed in part to its godly
connotations, and one did not have to be a mu‘tazil to grasp them.
Just as classical Islamic thought believed God to be the foundation of
the polity, since without God and the prophecy revealed to
Mu
ammad, there would have been no state, so, too, did it regard
God as the keystone that held the edifice of political etiquette and eth-
ical conduct in place. 20
Ni‘ma’s great import in political life suggests itself in the classical
Islamic tradition’s association of ni‘ma with formal pacts and oaths.
An early strain of the tradition holds that the verse “Be mindful of the
favour [ni‘ma] of God to you, and His covenant [mthq], which
He confirmed [wthaqa] with you when you said ‘We hear and
obey’” (Q 5:7) was revealed in the context of a binding agreement
drawn up among human beings: the Constitution of Medina. 21 In as-
sociating the two, the tradition understands divine-human and hu-
man-human pacts alike as formal extensions of the bestowal of
ni‘ma: anyone who formed a binding compact enacted the benefi-
cence (ni‘ma) of God. The creator of man was the original benefactor
(mun‘im) and remained the highest one; to bestow benefactions, then,
was to imitate God.
Ni‘ma as the basis for pacts —spoken and unspoken— remains a
pervasive leitmotif in the Geniza documents. When, for instance, a
Jew in twelfth-century Egypt petitioned a Fatimid amr for exemption
from the jizya by claiming descent from the Jews of Khaybar in North
Arabia, he described himself as “a Khaybar	 Israelite of the commu-
nity of Baghdad, from among those on whom God bestowed his bene-
factions (ni‘am),” by which he meant: from among those to whom
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20 See especially Crone, God’s Rule, 6, 10-14, who argues convincingly that Islam
emerged from the moment of its birth as a theopolitical religion because, unlike Christia-
nity and Buddhism, it was born into a stateless society. In the absence of a state, it had to
create one; the new religion allowed it to do so; and consequently Islamic political thin-
kers always simply assumed God to be the ultimate ruler and the cornerstone of all legal,
political, and ethical systems.
21 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 45.Mu
ammad had granted a special pact. 22 Benefactions (ni‘am) and
pacts were seen as synonymous; bestowal by man and by God were
analogous. 23
The men and women responsible for the Geniza documents dem-
onstrate an acute awareness that any bestowal of ni‘ma obliged its re-
ceiver to express al-shukr ‘al al-ni‘ma, gratitude for benefaction, or
shukr al-mun‘im, gratitude to the benefactor. That obligation was a
microcosm of social duty generally, since it motivated people to give
and obliged them to receive in a particular manner, even in the ab-
sence of coercive mechanisms compelling them to do either. 24
Though Arabic had developed a specialized vocabulary for express-
ing the dynamics of ni‘ma and shukr, the basic pattern is one on which
modern sociologists have also commented: Georg Simmel, for in-
stance, argued that when legal obligations mandate reciprocity, grati-
tude is unnecessary, while in the absence of legally mandated reci-
procity, gratitude provides “the reciprocity of service and return
service, even where they are not guaranteed by external coercion.” 25
Thanks, in other words, are out of place where one is obligated to ren-
der service. The question that drove Simmel to this observation is one
that has consumed students of human behavior since Aristotle: why
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22 Rajul isra’l khaybar min ahl Baghdd mim-man kna llh atamma ‘alayhi
ni‘amahu. Cambridge University Library, Taylor-Schechter (hereafter T-S) K 25.214,
line 4 of the Arabic text; edited in Khan, G., Arabic Legal and Administrative Documents
in the Cambridge Genizah Collections, Cambridge and New York, 1993, doc. 93.
23 On the Jews of Khaybar, see Caetani, L., Annali dell’Islm, Hildesheim, 1972
[1905-26], 2.1, 7 A.H., sec. 15 (pp. 19-20), 33 (pp. 31-32); cf. 10 a. H., sec. 101 (pp.
401-4); Baron, S.W., A Social and Religious History of the Jews, New York, 1957, 3, 86,
268 footnote 16; 264-65 footnote 8, 2nd ed. On later medieval Jewish claims of descent
from Khaybar	 Jews and thus exemption from the jizya, see Khan, Arabic Legal and Admi-
nistrative Documents, 244; cf. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 2, 386-87; Gil, M., A His-
tory of Palestine, 634-1099, E. Broido (transl.), Cambridge and New York, 1992, sec. 255;
Hirschfeld, H., “The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge,” JQR, 15 (1903),
167-81; and for a fascinating interpretation of literary representation of medieval Jews’
claims to descend from the Khaybar	 Jews, see Astren, F., “Explaining and Exploiting the
Past: Strategies for Historicizing Islam by Karaites and Others,” in M.Á. Gallego (ed.),
Reason and Faith in Medieval Judaism and Islam, Leiden, forthcoming.
24 I offer more details in a companion to the current article, “Benefaction (Ni‘ma),
Gratitude (Shukr), and the Politics of Giving and Receiving in Letters from the Cairo Ge-
niza,” in Y. Lev and M. Frenkel (eds.), Giving in Monotheistic Religions (in process), on
which this and the next paragraph are based.
25 Simmel, G., “Faithfulness and Gratitude,” in K.H. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg
Simmel, New York, 1950, 387; orig Soziologie, Exkurs VIII, Die Selbsterhaltung der so-
zialen Gruppe (1908).human beings act benevolently and ethically even when they are not
forced to do so. One need not hold a darkly Hobbesian view of the hu-
man character to recognize that continued generosity, particularly in
hierarchical situations in which gifts were sent from above to below,
requires some explanation. 26 The ethic of ni‘ma and shukr al-mun‘im
was the medieval Near East’s answer to this question: it granted so-
cial and political life its continuity and coherence, motivating people
to deeds of generosity even in the absence of material rewards for do-
ing so or punishments for failing to do so.
Just as the obligations incurred by one who had enjoyed ni‘ma
were considered required and binding, so, too, were benefactors re-
garded as bearing obligations toward their charges. Yet in practice,
the reciprocity was so thorough that it was never quite clear whose in-
terests were being served —those of the recipient of ni‘ma or those of
its bestower. When one acknowledged a benefit through thanks, it be-
gan to be counted as a benefit to the benefactor, too, not through some
system of presumed divine reward, but through the human calculus of
ni‘ma. The Abbasid courtier Ab ayyn al-Taw
	d	 (d. 1023) ex-
pressed this when he wrote that excluding an aspiring loyalist from
rank “is like the ingratitude (kufrn) of a follower for a benefit
(ni‘ma),” on the face of it a strange analogy: so reciprocal was this
kind of loyalty, he argued, that patrons could not merely enjoy their
high positions without fulfilling the obligations of patronage. 27 The
eleventh-century Jewish merchant Ism‘	lb .I s 
q al-Andalus	 of
Tyre understood this, too: in asking the long-distance trading magnate
Nahray b. Nissim in Fustat for some goods to sell, he justified his re-
quest by writing, “if you were to honor me (...) with a commission or
an opportunity for service (khidma), this would be a very great bene-
faction (ni‘ma) for me, and I believe that you would be prolonged by
it.” 28 The bestower of ni‘ma stood to benefit by granting an opportu-
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26 The classic study of the question remains Mauss, M., The Gift: The Form and
Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, W.D. Halls (transl.), London, 1990 [1950].
27 irmn al-mu’ammil min al-ra’s ka-kufrn al-ni‘ma min al-tbi‘. Ab ayyn
al-Tawh	d	, Mathlib al-wazrayn, Damascus, 1961, 15, cited in Mottahedeh, Loyalty
and Leadership, 73 footnote 34.
28 T-S 10 J 5.12, in Judaeo-Arabic, published in Gil, M., Palestine During the First
Muslim Period (634-1099), (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1983, doc. 510. The scribe is from Ba-
dajoz; the letter discusses a shipment of Khurasan	 silk that was sent from Aleppo to Tyre
and then Egypt and saved after delays along the way. Quotation from recto, lines 20-21.nity for service (khidma); and if such motivational rhetoric were to
have any effect, it had to reflect a code of conduct vigorously enough
in force to be considered binding.
At the same time, thanks for service could be renounced as a way
of confirming the loftiness of the person one served. When an elev-
enth-century Jew named Mubrak b. Ibrh	m b. Shemu’el petitioned
a Fatimid courtier titled Mu‘tam	d al-Dawla to serve in his retinue, he
claimed to do so solely out of the desire to “be under his command
(‘inda awmirihi), not for reward or thanks (min ghayr juz’ wa-l
shukr), but out of pride in his service (il fakhr bi-khidmatihi).” 29 By
renouncing material rewards and gratitude, he suggested that the op-
portunity to serve Mu‘tamid al-Dawla was its own reward, and conse-
quently deferred to the loftiness and dignity of the courtier himself.
In the preceding quotations, both Ism‘	l al-Andalus	 and
Mubrak b. Ibrh	m use the term khidma. Like ni‘ma, this term is
laden with meaning, but meaning of a special type in Judaeo-Arabic
documents. It is sometimes used in the usual manner to indicate ser-
vice of any type, as when the otherwise unknown Ye
ezqel b.
Ibrh	m petitioned the mercantile magnate Ab ‘ImrnM s b. Ab	
l-ayy for clothing and complained that he had not left his house in
two years due to weakness from hunger; he explained that he would
have lodged his request with the head of the Jews (ra’s al-yahd),
Mevorakh b. Se‘adya (ca. 1079-82 and 1094-1111), but the latter was
occupied with service to the ruler (mashghl bi-khidmat al-suln), in
this case the Fatimid vizier al-Afal. 30 But the word khidma fre-
quently bore the more specific sense in which Ism‘	l al-Andalus	
used it: a khidma was an opportunity for service and, as such, an op-
portunity for the giver to merit gratitude. Mark R. Cohen was the first
to recognize this sense of the term, missing from Arabic dictionaries,
in Judaeo-Arabic petitions from the poor: khidma can refer to the pe-
tition itself, as if by requesting help, the petition does the petitioned
party a service by turning him or her into a patron; khidma can also
refer to thanks offered the patron in the form of prayers, again as
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29 T-S Ar. 39.464, lines 9-10; edited in Khan, Arabic Legal and Administrative Do-
cuments, 96.
30 T-S 13 J 28.10, in Judaeo-Arabic, unpublished; see Cohen, M.R., Jewish Self-Go-
vernment in Medieval Egypt: The Origins of the Office of Head of the Jews, ca.
1065-1126, Princeton, 1980, 220.though the petitioner serves the petitioned not merely through work
but by increasing his or her merit. 31 A fragmentary draft of a petition
to the Fatimid caliph al-Mustanir preserved in the Geniza suggests
this: “The slave of our lord, blessings of God be upon him,” it opens,
“kisses the ground and humbly beseeches that he be granted a ser-
vice”: the petitioner was asking for benefaction that would redound to
the caliph’s merit. 32 Khidma, then, was understood to be something
that served both the giver and the receiver. It reflects the amphibolous
nature of ni‘ma, from which both the giver and the receiver benefit-
ted. But while ni‘ma was granted by the upper party in the hierarchy
and enjoyed by the lower, khidma could be offered by either to the
benefit of both. Khidma in this sense also preserves, again in fossil-
ized form, the older structure of wal’: when a mawl on manumis-
sion ceded himself and his lands to the personal protection of his pa-
tron, this was known as khidma, now in the specialized sense of
commendation. 33
These examples suggest that the calculus of benefit was widely
understood and repeatedly invoked. Though less frequently invoked,
the converse calculus was as widely understood: failure to recognize
benefactions was considered a breach of major proportions. Like in-
gratitude toward God, ingratitude toward human patrons was called
kufr al-ni‘ma, and the denial that any benefaction had been granted at
all entailed severe consequences. Ties could be broken by denying
that ni‘ma had ever been granted. 34
One might be surprised to witness a Jewish petitioner threatening
to withdraw his loyalty from the Fatimid caliph, but this is precisely
what Shelomo b. Yehuda al-Fs	, the remarkably durable leader
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31 Cohen, M.R., Poverty and Charity in the Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt,
Princeton and Oxford, 2005, 187-88, especially 187 footnote 51. See also his comments
on charity as a form of patronage, idem, The Voice of the Poor in the Middle Ages: An
Anthology of Documents from the Cairo Geniza, Princeton and Oxford, 2005, 10-12.
32 ‘Abd mawln alawt allh ‘alayhi yuqabbil al-ar
 wa-ya
ra‘ f istikhdmihi.
T-S Misc. 28.169, line 3 of the Arabic text; edited in Khan, Arabic Legal and Adminis-
trative Documents, doc. 76. Istikhdm is not necessarily a request for employment, as
Khan suggests; but cf. T-S K 16.61, line 7 (ibidem, doc. 92), an Ayyubid petition from on
behalf of two young archers, in which it does refer to a request for work.
33 Crone, Slaves on Horses, 49 and 237 footnote 354, citing Ab l-Faraj al-Ifahn	,
Kitb al-aghn, Cairo, 1927, 12, 44.
34 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 77: “since one acknowledged ties by accep-
ting ni‘mah, a man could cast off ties, and in particular could cast off his allegiance, by
claiming that no ni‘mah had been given by the other party.”(ga’on) of the Jewish academy of Jerusalem (1025-51), did in a peti-
tion to al-hir (1021-36). As ga’on, Shelomo b. Yehuda was head of
the Rabbanite Jewish community of Fatimid Egypt and Syria, but
during his long tenure in office he struggled to fight off rivals, incur-
sions into his jurisdiction, and competitors for his prerogatives. The
first of these rivals (we will meet the second shortly) was Ysuf
al-Sijilms	 of Ramla, chief (ra’s) of the Iraqi Jewish community of
Palestine, who hoped to break away from the ga’on’s jurisdiction and
to that end, around 1030, petitioned al-hir for a rescript of investi-
ture and some of the privileges that Shelomo b. Yehuda now enjoyed
—despite the fact al-hir had granted Shelomo b. Yehuda his own
rescript of investiture when he acceded to office in 1025. Initiative for
administrative changes in the structure of the Jewish community had
to come from the Jews themselves, though the Fatimid caliphs were
happy to offer decrees and ratify rescripts when asked to do so; the
only way Shelomo b. Yehuda could defend himself, then, was by
writing his own petition to the caliph. That petition survived in the
Geniza in a later copy, from which we learn of the conflict between
rivals, and of the terms in which Shelomo b. Yehuda defended his
office. 35
Moments in which loyalties are threatened offer rare insight into
how the calculus of patronage functioned. Shelomo b. Yehuda made
his case principally by reminding the caliph of the bonds of mutual
obligation that the two men shared. The privileges the caliph had
granted him, Shelomo b. Yehuda explained, were ni‘am, benefac-
tions; these had created a personal, individual bond between them that
could not be divided or meted out to other leaders. The privileges
the caliph had granted to Ysuf al-Sijilms	 had “split apart”
(tasha‘‘atha) the ni‘ma the caliph had granted Shelomo b. Yehuda;
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35 ENA 4020.65 (formerly MS Adler 109), published in Goitein, S.D., “Congrega-
tion versus Community: An Unknown Chapter in the Communal History of Jewish Pa-
lestine,” JQR, 44 (1954), 291-304, with a facsimile between pages 291 and 292; see the
revised interpretation in idem, “Petitions to the Fatimid Caliphs from the Cairo Geniza,”
JQR, 45 (1954), 30-38; and the new edition in Gil, Palestine, doc. 312, and see his dis-
cussion in ibidem, sec. 771, where he identifies the handwriting as that of Avraham b.
Furt; for the same hand, cf. T-S Ar. 30.278 and Bodleian Library, MS Heb. b 18.21, rec-
to, in Judaeo-Arabic, published in Stern, S.M., “A Petition to the Fimid Caliph al-Mus-
tanir Concerning a Conflict within the Jewish Community,” Revue des Études Juives,
128 (1969), 203-22. Detailed discussion in Rustow, M., Heresy and the Politics of Com-
munity: The Jews of the Fatimid Caliphate, Ithaca, 2008, 94-99.and one could not merely split apart ni‘ma without risking accusa-
tions of disloyalty. 36 These were not merely idle words. Shelomo b.
Yehuda proceeded to take this argument to its logical extreme, threat-
ening to withdraw his gratitude from the caliph. If the caliph granted
al-Sijilms	 the same ni‘ma he had already granted him, Shelomo b.
Yehuda explained, “then the ni‘ma bestowed [upon me] would be no
ni‘ma at all.” 37 If no ni‘ma had been granted, he was within his rights
to sever the relationship. To reinforce this threat, he invoked the in-
vestitures that the caliph’s father, grandfather, and great-grandfather
had granted his predecessors, comparing their loyalty invidiously
with the current caliph’s promiscuity: “The pure excellencies have
made grants in many rescripts to many heads (of the Jews) over the
course of time, a fact of which the archives offer proof, but they have
never made any one of them a partner in what they bestowed on
them.” This seemingly indictive sentence was followed by a
quasi-formulaic phrase likely to convince the caliph of Shelomo b.
Yehuda’s loyalty to the regime despite the accusations: “for the de-
cree of the Government, may God bestow glory upon its victories, is
laid down.” 38
Indeed, a severed relationship is an inexplicably bold thing for a
dhimm dependent like Shelomo b. Yehuda to threaten, and before a
caliph no less. In doing so, he had the force of several sets of obliga-
tions in his favour: his personal relationship to the caliph, which the
caliph also had to treat seriously or risk his legitimacy in the eyes of
the Jewish community; the dhimma (pact) between Muslim rulers and
their non-Muslim subjects, which by definition entailed mutual obli-
gations, not just those of the subalterns toward their rulers; and a
common store of political vocabulary, which allowed Shelomo b.
Yehuda to express these ideas succinctly yet comprehensibly, with all
the implications of reciprocity that the word ni‘ma entailed. The use
of coded language, in other words, loaded the petition with particular
connotations intended to conjure up the bonds of loyalty between po-
litical men.
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36 ENA 4020.65, lines 25-27. It may be that the verb tasha‘‘uth, “splitting apart”,
should be tasha‘‘ub, “scattering”, a possibility for which I am indebted to Devin Stewart.
Indeed, the Judaeo-Arabic copyist was apparently faced with the unpointed chancery
hand of the original and may have read one for the other.
37 ENA 4020.65, lines 5-6.
38 ENA 4020.65, lines 27-30.Ni‘ma, then, was the most basic element in exchanges of protection
and loyalty, and its consequences were profoundly understood and
broadly invoked in political relationships. But if ni‘ma shaped all
bonds of patronage, ties between benefactors and receivers could be
expressed in a number of different ways, using a variety of metaphors.
Patronage and its Metaphors
Three distinct images evoking patronage recur in the Geniza mate-
rial: ‘inya, providential care, as God’s for mankind; ri‘ya, tending,
as one does a flock; and iin‘, nurturing or rearing, as one offers a
child.
‘Inya
‘Inya, like ni‘ma, has quranic roots and human consequences; in
works of philosophy, God’s providence is called al-‘inya al-ilhya,
while in the Sufi lexicon, al-‘inya means divine benefaction or gen-
erosity. Like ni‘ma, it, too, was a form of benefaction in exchange for
which one was obligated to render one’s loyalty to the benefactor. The
root on which it is based means to concern or disquiet, but ‘inya
came to mean attention or solicitude of a special type. The term
might, then, be translated as patronage without doing much violence
to its original sense.
When, for instance, in 1037-38 the distinguished and extremely
old Hayya b. Sherira (d. 1038), ga’on of one of the rabbinic acade-
mies of Baghdad and spiritual leader of Iraqi Jewish congregants all
over the Mediterranean, learned of a plot against one of his appoin-
tees, Sahln b. Avraham, the head of the Iraqi congregation of Fustat,
he wrote to Sahln to advise him how to act. The first thing he ex-
plained was that Sahln should draw on the help of an old friend and
ally at the Fatimid court in Cairo, the Qaraite courtier Ab l-Nar
al-Fal( esed) al-Tustar	. “I shall write to (al-Tustar	),” Hayya
promised Sahln, “and ask him to tell me about the situation with all
its facts and to direct his solicitude (‘inya) toward you.” 39 Thus did
Al-Qanara (AQ) XXIX 2, julio-diciembre 2008, pp. 341-382 ISSN 0211-3589
360 MARINA RUSTOW
39 Cambridge University Library, Jacques Mosseri Collection, Ia 5 (L 2), in Ju-Hayya call upon providential care for his charge at a great distance; it
was al-Tustar	’s loyalty toward Hayya that enabled him to do so, and
it was al-Tustar	’s high rank that allowed him to watch over Sahln
and protect him. Likewise, when Ab Sa‘	db .riq, a Jewish trader
from Ifr	qiya living in Palermo, wrote to his brother Ab l-Barakti n
Fustat around 1060, he extended greetings to their trade associates,
and specifically those from whom his brother might expect loyalty,
referring to them as “all those whom your solicitude (‘inya) encom-
passes and whom your patronage (ri‘ya) surrounds.” 40 Similarly,
when some time after 1060 another pair of brothers learned that the
man to whom their sister had been betrothed for years had suffered
severe financial losses, they attempted to break the engagement by
sending a petition to the head of the Jews (ra’s al-yahd or nagid)o f
Fatimid Egypt and Syria beseeching him, in his capacity as chief
magistrate, to annul the engagement: “the slave (mamlk) requests in-
tervention from the lord (mawl) in (his) patronage (‘inya),” they
wrote, reminding him —out of the pure pragmatics of self-interest—
of his obligations toward them. 41
As I have suggested above, one of the chief difficulties in reading
material like this lies in knowing how much weight terms carry. Even
if one establishes that terms are technical terms, are they being used
in a debased sense, as mere formulary? This is true, for instance, of
the metaphor of “slave” (mamlk) and “master” (mawl): in the peti-
tion I have just quoted and others, the terms are almost too pervasive
and seemingly banal to bear analysis. But their omnipresence in peti-
tions —which merely by their submission made petitioners the slaves
of those whose favour they requested— reflects the importance of the
informal type of patronage relationship after the first three Islamic
centuries. More importantly, it reflects the tendency of political rela-
tionships to be expressed as individual ties. The use of formulaic lan-
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daeo-Arabic; edited in Chapira, E.D., “Lettre du Gaon Hai,” Revue des Études Juives, 82
(1926), 327; and Gil, M., In the Kingdom of Ishmael, (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem,
1997, doc. 41. For a nearly complete translation to English see Rustow, Heresy and the
Politics of Community, 299-301.
40 T-S 13 J 26.10, in Judaeo-Arabic, lines 28-29 (jam‘ man tashmiluhu ‘inyatuka
wa-tau bihi ri‘yatuka). Goitein’s edition published on-line by the Princeton Geniza
Project (www.princeton.edu/~geniza) (hereafter PGP); see idem, Mediterranean Society,
1, 274; also edited in Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 830.
41 Wa-l-mamlk yastashfa‘u min al-mawl f l-‘inya. ENA 1822a 4, in Judaeo-Ara-
bic, lines 9-10. Goitein’s edition published on-line by the PGP.guage was part and parcel of the importance of individual ties: in peti-
tions, the proper use of formulaic language delivered or denied the
petitioner his or her success; adherence to proper etiquette in and of
itself expressed the petitioner’s sincerity and the worthiness of his or
her case for redress. This reflects the capacity of language to shape
social ties —palpable in the sources I have read and likely as palpable
for those who wrote them and for whom they were intended.
But once these terms had become old and worn —or as Nietzsche
put it, once the coins of metaphor had lost their embossing— the ten-
dency of terms of patronage to harden into formulaic language re-
flected a different sort of linguistic formalism, the one to which I re-
ferred above as the capacity of set phrases to carry echoes and
resonances from the past. 42 The same tendency also appears in the
way honorifics hardened into permanent titulature. 43 More broadly,
in epistolary form, linguistic formalism appears in the pervasiveness
of the petition as a genre of letter writing, from paupers to amrs.
Nor did a petition have to be of a formal or public nature to reflect
this type of linguistic formalism: most of the petitions preserved in
the Cairo Geniza were sent by and to private parties regarding per-
sonal matters. Yet they adhere scrupulously to a particular structure,
and even to particular phrases. That does not mean that the form and
formularies of the documents were debased or devalued, mere
form-letters into which the specifics of the case were inserted. With
Mottahedeh, I am inclined to understand the use of particular con-
structs in set or formulaic phrases as demonstrating not the lack of
weight to be accorded to a particular term, but its pervasive meaning;
“by their flattery,” as he put it, “they show its importance.” 44
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42 Mottahedeh attributes this to the linguistic formalism of “a scripturalist tradition
in which an immutable text lies at the heart of religious study,” since words continue to
carry quranic resonances even when used in non-religious contexts (Loyalty and Lea-
dership, 9), but the phenomenon may be a purely sociolinguistic one: compare the origins
of the modern Italian informal greeting ciao in the gallant and formal greeting in Vene-
tian dialect, “sc’ia[v]o” (standard Italian schiavo [vostro]), “[your] slave.”
43 Balog, P., “Pious Invocations Probably Used as Titles of Office or as Honorific
Titles in Umayyad and Abbasid Times,” in M. Rosen-Ayalon (ed.), Studies in Memory of
Gaston Wiet, Jerusalem, 1977, 61-68; see further Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of
Community, 76-86, with reference to earlier studies.
44 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 93.Ri‘ya
Ri‘ya, the special care of the shepherd toward his flock, also
bears a dual usage as plain or technical language, though in this case,
distinguishing between the two is not difficult. Ri‘ya can indicate
simply supervision and oversight, as when letter-writers urge mail
carriers (often their friends) to exercise special care (ri‘ya) in ensur-
ing that letters reached their destinations. 45 But the word’s origins in
the verb “to tend” also lent it special connotations of guardianship,
protection, and patronage, with even more subtle shades of meaning
in Judaeo-Arabic. 46 When, for instance, Ab Zikr	, a young Jewish
physician in the retinue of the Ayyubid sultan al-Malik al-‘Az	z,
wrote to his mother, Sitt al-Ghazal, to ask her to host a friend and his
wife, he urged her to accommodate them “with the benefaction
(isn) of your support and your patronage (ri‘ya).” 47 The term
could also invoke less fleeting and more binding kinds of patronage:
when the Jerusalem ga’on Shelomo b. Yehuda confided in a letter of
1030 that he had been betrayed by some of his erstwhile supporters,
he complained about one man in particular who he had hoped would
help him “with a favour (al-jaml). As if it is not enough that he did
not help me,” he lamented, the man “was in the palm of my enemy’s
hand (f kiffat al-ghayr), and supported me in keeping with the saying,
‘then the people of the land weakened the hands of the people of Ju-
dah, and harried them while they were building’ [Ezra 4:4].” He
added: “I know that he is patronizing that group (annahu yur‘
al-qawm), because they support him.” 48 The implication was that the
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45 See, e.g., T-S 10 J 5.6 + TS 20.113, in Judaeo-Arabic, a letter of 1100 from the
Qaraites of Ascalon on the fate of captives from the Crusade conquests in Palestine, ex-
pressing the wish that the letter arrive f mur‘at al-rasl, edited in Goitein, S.D., Palesti-
nian Jewry in Early Islamic and Crusader Times in Light of Geniza Documents, J. Hac-
ker (ed.), (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1980, 240-50, and Gil, Palestine, doc. 577, and translated
to English in Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 5, 372-79. See also T-S 16.27, in Ju-
daeo-Arabic, line 12; Goitein’s edition published on-line by the PGP. The verb r‘a can
also mean “to heed” (see, e.g., Bodl. MS Heb. b 18.21, verso, line 4).
46 This meaning is not reflected in the Arabic dictionaries I have consulted; cf. also
Blau, J., A Dictionary of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic Texts, Jerusalem, 2007, s.v. R‘Y III
(253).
47 Min isniki l-nar wa-l-ri‘ya. Bodl. MS Heb C 50.24, in Judaeo-Arabic; Goi-
tein’s edition published on-line by the PGP. The quotation is from line 6.
48 T-S 13 J 19.16 and T-S 13 J 16.15 (the second shelf-mark is a later copy of the
first), in Judaeo-Arabic, published in Baneth, D.Z., “A Letter from Shelomo b. Judah,group would not have lent Shelomo b. Yehuda’s rival their loyalty
were not the rival extending them his patronage. Ri‘ya was, then,
the obverse of loyalty: patrons meted out the first in exchange for the
second.
This is even clearer in a letter by the second pretender to Shelomo
b. Yehuda’s post, the highly ambitious Natan b. Avraham, who
usurped his position outright for four years. In Jerusalem in autumn,
1038, Natan b. Avraham arrogated the ga’on’s title and began using it
to sign his correspondence; he continued to exercise gaonic titulature
and privileges until autumn, 1042, appointing judges, writing
responsa, and dispensing titles to his followers. One reason he got
away with it for so long was that he had allies at the Fatimid court: by
now it was no secret that the stability of a ga’on’s tenure in office
hinged on his cultivating allies in Cairo; only in this way might he as-
sure himself of obtaining rescripts of investiture from the caliph’s
chancery. 49 Armed with this information, Natan b. Avraham set about
assiduously cultivating the loyalty of the grandees of Fustat; one of
these was al-Tustar	, whom we met above. Acutely aware of
al-Tustar	’s centrality to his ambitions, Natan b. Avraham closely fol-
lowed his progress through the Fatimid hierarchy. In 1040, he learned
of al-Tustar	’s appointment as administrator (ktib) of the military
commander (amr al-juysh) of Palestine, the Turkish general and
manumitted slave Anushtek	n al-Duzbar	. Natan b. Avraham wasted
no time in reporting to his allies in Fustat the fact that their powerful
patron at court had been made more powerful. Al-Tustar	 “was ap-
pointed a ktib of the amr al- juysh,” Natan b. Avraham announced,
“and he is our patron (wa-huwa mur‘ lan), heeding what we direct
his way (mumtathil m nukhibuhu fhi).” 50 Ri‘ya was the term of
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Gaon of the Jerusalem Yeshiva, to an Anonymous Party in Fustat,” in Studia orientalia
memoriae D.H. Baneth dedicata, Jerusalem, 1979, 1-16, and in Gil, Palestine, doc. 92
(cf. both their translations, and cf. Blau, Dictionary, s.v. R‘Y III [253]).
49 On the gaonic schism of 1038-1042, see Cohen, M.R., “New Light on the Conflict
over the Palestinian Gaonate, 1038-1042, and on Daniel b. ‘Azarya: A Pair of Letters to
the Nagid of Qayrawan,” Association for Jewish Studies Review, 1 (1976), 1-37; Gil,
Paestine, 1, secs. 870-84; Ben-Sasson, M., The Emergence of the Local Jewish Commu-
nity in the Muslim World: Qayrawan, 800-1057, (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1997, 368-72; Gil,
In the Kingdom of Ishmael, sec. 48; and Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of Community,
302-22.
50 T-S AS 157.232r + T-S AS 157.231r, in Judaeo-Arabic; published in Gil, M., The
Tustaris, Family and Sect, (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1981, doc. 6, with facsimile.choice, then, to describe patronage relationships in which the element
of hierarchy was well defined; it matters little that Natan b. Avraham
was an exceedingly insincere pretender whom Shelomo b. Yehuda de-
scribed at the height of the conflict as “riding around on his donkey
all day long” in imitation of the ‘ulam’, “going from gate to gate and
beseeching (people), Help me, oh help me, and I shall respond to your
(legal) queries,” or that he was entirely disingenuous in his cultivation
of al-Tustar	’s patronage. Ri‘ya’s place in social relations was well
enough understood that Natan b. Avraham had only to invoke it to
convey his meaning.
If ri‘ya was the term of choice to describe hierarchical relation-
ships, the hierarchical implications of the term might accurately re-
flect the relationship itself or might merely follow on the terms used
to lodge a request. In this way language created relationships as much
as the converse. Likewise, men more nearly equal in station could
summon up the language of patronage to soften requests they made of
each other. Yosef b. Shemarya, a Jewish judge of Barqa, turned an
ally into a patron in this way, at least for immediate rhetorical pur-
poses. Sometime in the last third of the eleventh century, the judge
spent the winter in Alexandria and decided to return home to Barqa
rather than complete his pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Before heading
back West he wrote to the shipping magnate Nahray b. Nissim to set-
tle some business before Nahray himself headed to Jerusalem. The
judge asked Nahray to repay a debt of two dnrs, and immediately
attempted to soften his request with flattery: “for you are my protec-
tor (mur‘in l) and the judg[e of my affairs] (q
[  jat]).” 51 By
using the term mur‘, Yosef b. Shemarya conjured up a set of associ-
ations intended to manage Nahray’s reaction: because you are my pa-
tron and protector, you will indulge my little request and not become
angry about it; it would be so unlike you, in your magnanimity, to act
illiberally toward me.
One does wonder, in reading these letters, which terms reflect
some mixture of sincerity and formalism and which are mere empty
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51 Li-annahu mur‘l  wa-q
[  jat] wa-qad faraja ‘ann f hdh l-waqt bi-hdh
shy’. New York, Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, Elkan Nathan
Adler collection (henceforth ENA) 2805.13, in Judaeo-Arabic. A.L. Udovitch’s edition
published on-line by the PGP. See also Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 2, 274 (who
translates part of the following section).markers. Below I will suggest that this question is misleading; for the
moment one need only think of our own terms of etiquette to under-
stand that they can be both at once. Yet by the late eleventh century, at
least in Judaeo-Arabic, some terms had clearly come unmoored from
the social contexts in which they had originally harboured and flour-
ished. And this tendency of affective idioms to harden into formulaic
phrases finally extended to the most tender, intimate, and, ultimately,
bastardized of terms for patronage: iin‘, a term literally indicating
favour, kindness, or conferring or receiving benefit, but by extension,
nurturing or fostering a special protégé.
Iin‘
Iin‘ is an important term in Mottahedeh’s anatomy of the social
world of ghilmn and kuttb alike: it is the very substance of net-
works of patronage. It “is a surprisingly formal and serious relation-
ship,” he writes; “a man expected from his protégé (muana‘ or an‘
or an‘ah) not an easy gratitude and affection, but a lifelong commit-
ment of sizable dimensions. To say ‘he is my an‘ah’ meant he is the
person I have reared, educated, and trained well,’ and the obligation
to such a patron was like the obligation to a parent, except that it was
neither inherited nor transferable by legacy.” 52
Of the numerous telling anecdotes Mottahedeh musters on iin‘,
the most striking comes from the continuation of al-abar	’s history
by Mu
ammad b. ‘Abd al-Malik al-amadhn	 (d. 1127), a courtier
and chronicler under the Abbasid caliph al-Mustahir (1094-1118), a
single volume of which has survived covering the years 295-487 A.H.
Al-amadhn	 recounts the death of the Buwayhid vizier Ab
Mu
ammad al-Muhallab	 (d. 352/963), which left his protégé, the
Christian clerk (ktib) and physician Ab l-‘Al’‘ s b. al-asan b.
Abrn, without a patron. So unprotected was Ibn Abrn that
al-Muhallab	’s rivals tortured him to find out where al-Muhallab	 had
hidden his wealth before dying. When they threatened to kill Ibn
Abrn, he proclaimed: “Shall I be Ibn Abrn, the physician and
phlebotomist plying his trade on the street for a [measly] fee of one
and a half dniqs, whom the vizier Ab Mu
ammad took and patron-
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52 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 77.ized (iana‘an) and made his private secretary (ktib sirrihi), and
who has become known as one in his service (bi-khidmatihi) —and
inform people of a treasure he has stored up for his son? By God, I
would not do so even if I were to perish.” So durable were the bonds
of iin‘ that ‘s wished to be known after his patron’s death as hav-
ing been discovered and made by him; and so convincing was this ar-
gument to the officials who succeeded al-Muhallab	 that they freed
him and took him into their own service. 53
Iin‘ was, then, a way of creating political ties and perpetuating
a political class; those who failed to bestow it upon their chosen sub-
ordinates were less likely to end their careers alive, and conversely,
the chronicles are filled with stories of rulers and commanders saved
from death or defeat by ghilmn whom they convinced should be
loyal toward them. 54 Ibn Khaldn, notoriously inclined to filter even
the most urban and deracinated of Arab histories through the experi-
ence of the desert, saw iin‘ as a later but hardly attenuated form of
the ancient fictive kinship through which the Arabs assimilated
strangers to their tribes by wal’. “When people (of group feeling,
‘aabiyya) adopt as followers (iana‘a) people of another descent or
take slaves (‘ibidd) and clients (mawl) into servitude and enter into
close contact with them,” he wrote, echoing the etymological mean-
ing of wal’, to be near, “as we have said, the clients and followers
(muana‘n) share in the group feeling of their masters and take it on
as if it were their own group feeling.” 55 Thus Ibn Khaldn held urban
and evolved (or devolved, as he might have seen them) forms of pa-
tronage to preserve, even in fossilized forms, the social patterns of
tribal society. In the court chronicles of the tenth and eleventh centu-
ries, iin‘ is of another species entirely, worlds away from tribal so-
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53 Mu
ammad b. ‘Abd al-Malik al-Hamadhn	, Takmilat trkh al-abar, A.
Kan‘an (ed.), Beirut, 1961, 185; quoted in Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership,9 0( I
have altered his translation slightly).
54 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 91 (Ibn al-Zayyt, from al-Tankh	,
Nishwr al-mu
ara wa-akhbr al-mudhkara); 88-89 (Rzbahn and Mu‘izz al-Daw-
la, from al-Miskawayh, Tajrib al-umam; Jall al-Dawla, from Ibn al-Ath	r, al-Kmil f
l-trkh; ‘Izz al-Dawla, from al-Miskawayh, Tajrib al-umam); but cf. ibidem, 40-41
(al-Muqtadir, from al-Miskawayh, Tajrib al-umam).
55 ‘Abd al-Ra
mnb .M u 
ammad ibn Khaldn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction
to History, F. Rosenthal (transl.), New York, 1958, 1, 276 [1, 245] (my translation differs
slightly); cited in Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 89-90.ciety; it refers to elective clientage, to the caliphs’, viziers’, and
amrs’ relationships to the secretaries and the palace guards of whom
they expected loyalty (even if they did not always receive it). And in
the chronicles it recurs as the most intimate and durable form of pa-
tronage among men at court: fostering a protégé was like raising
one’s own child.
All the more surprising, then, that in the Judaeo-Arabic correspon-
dence, the term appears in this sense exceedingly rarely, even in let-
ters describing the relationships of merchants to their apprentices and
great scholars to their disciples. Both traders and the Jewish ‘ulam’
apprenticed their sons to one another; the opportunities for this kind
of iin‘ were abundant. Yet its sparse appearances in the sense of
patronage in the Geniza sources lead one to conclude either that the
word was reserved for courtly patronage, or even for ghilmn and
other military and bureaucratic fosterage; or that it took another turn
as the courts of Iraq and Iran receded from view.
I might have expected to find it, for instance, in a business letter
regarding a long list of expensive textiles and clothing that the trader
Ms al-Thirt	 sent to Sahl al-Tustar	, the eldest brother of a trading
clan and the father of the Tustar	 mentioned above, writing about a
common business associate, Ab Zikr	 Yehuda, one of the chief mer-
chants of Qayrawn and a grandee closely connected with both the
Thirt	 merchants and the Z	rid rulers of Ifr	qiya. Ab Zikr	 had asked
the Tustar	s to arrange some purchases for him in Egypt and sent his
ghulm to fetch the items —the mercantile elite, too, kept ghilmn,
yet another opportunity to cultivate ties of fosterage (iin‘). Then
the Tustar	 brothers had gone and asked the ghulm a favour that they
now worried stretched the bonds of Ab Zikr	’s generosity: imposing
on a man’s ghulm was like imposing on the man, and to be avoided.
Ms al-Thirt	 therefore took it upon himself to reassure al-Tustar	
that “the ghulm, my lord, was not terribly inconvenienced,” and
even if he had been, Ab Zikr	 would not have minded, for “the man
seeks your friendship (widd)... and a connection with you (through
marriage); he wants to profit from your high position (jh) and have
your advice in his undertakings.” Ab Zikr	 didn’t mind, in other
words, because he wanted Sahl al-Tustar	 to feel indebted to him. So
great was his desire to strengthen his connection with al-Tustar	 that if
he “had a son fit to apprentice in your firm (yakhdim quddmakum),
he would have been honored by this” and sent him to them immedi-
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have used the term iin‘ regarding the apprenticeship of his putative
son with colleagues, if not with his very ghulm. Yet he did not.
In fact, the only instance of iin‘ in this sense that I have found
in the corpus of more than four thousand documents I have
searched 57 appears in a letter from a different Ab Zikr	, this one the
young Jewish physician at the court of al-Malik al-‘Az	z whom I
mentioned earlier. In 1196, Ab Zikr	 wrote to his father, the judge
Eliyyahu b. Zekharya, explaining that he was unable to leave Jerusa-
lem on order of his superior, the sultan, who was in Damascus; he
therefore asked his father to send him some medicines he could not
acquire himself and also sent greetings to some physician colleagues
in Fustat. In particular, he sent good wishes to a mentor, a certain Ab
l-Mukram, “the father of my brother al-Rash	dA b  ‘Al	. I have sent
him a (separate) letter in which I thank him for the kindness of his
benefaction and patronage (‘al jaml an‘ihi wa-iin‘ihi).” 58 The
insistence with which Ab Zikr	 uses both an‘ and iin‘ suggests
that he knew precisely what he was doing. The medical profession
was usually passed from father to son; Ab Zikr	’s father was a physi-
cian, but like scholars and scribes, he aimed to augment his son’s pro-
fessional capital and contacts by sending him to apprentice with a col-
league. Ab Zikr	 now thought of his mentor’s son as a brother and of
his mentor as having nurtured him adoptively. Can it be Ab Zikr	’s
years of contact with the Ayyubid court that had taught him to express
the tie in terms of iin‘? And is it a mere accident of preservation
that such ties are not expressed in these terms more frequently in the
correspondence of the Geniza?
In fact, the traders I discussed above had just as much contact with
the courts of amrs and caliphs as Ab Zikr	, and they were surely
aware of this kind of fosterage as an important type of political tie.
Nor is it the case that iin‘ and related words do not appear in the
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56 T-S 12.133, in Judaeo-Arabic, recto, lines 12-14; edited in Gil, The Tustaris,
69-75, with facsimile; and idem, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 128; translated to En-
glish in Goitein, S.D., Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, Princeton, 1973, 74-79.
57 I searched the database of the PGP, which contains roughly four thousand docu-
ments, including many of those published in the monographs cited above as well as un-
published editions by S.D. Goitein, A.L. Udovitch, M.R. Cohen, and others.
58 T-S 13 J 22.24, in Judaeo-Arabic, verso, line 18; edited in Goitein, Palestinian
Jewry, 322-26.corpus at all. On the contrary: they appear abundantly, but in another
meaning; and in the transformation of iin‘ lies another clue to the
evolution of patron-client ties outside the world of the courts.
A Jewish notable writing from Alexandria in autumn 1200, for in-
stance, used the term in passing in a letter describing the shortage of
wheat and water in the city, a crisis preceding the great famine of in
Egypt in 1201-2, in ordering a staggeringly large quantity of wheat
from Fustat to feed both his family and the community in his care. He
instructed his addressee to send the wheat in care of a Muslim mes-
senger in order to ward off the evil eye (i.e., robbery) “from the gen-
tiles, who menace the Jews daily with plunder” and specified that to
evade a high toll, the Muslim messenger should “rely on his high po-
sition (jh) to enter the city,” that is, should make it known that he has
connections in government. 59 The writer, furthermore, unwilling to
risk an ineffective appeal, lodged his request in the formal register of
petitions; his resort to this element of written formalism suggests the
desperate straits in which he found himself. “May the beneficent pres-
ence (al-a
ra al-mun‘ima),” he flattered his addressee, “(send) his
slave ten irdabbs (of wheat; the letter is lacunose here)... The slave is
importunate: all year his house has been empty, with no wheat in it,
despite his large family and numerous followers. May God, may he
be exalted, extend remedy for the affliction and benefit (mann)t oH i s
servant by means of your patronage (iin‘) and protection
(iftiqd).” 60 God would extend his providential care, and the ad-
dressee in Fustat would be the executor of God’s will in his patronage
(iin‘), protection (iftiqd), and his role as benefactor (mun‘im).
Though use of iin‘ here bears the overtones of special oversight
and protection that it also bears in cases of true clientage, it also hints
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59 ENA NS 19.10, in Judaeo-Arabic and Hebrew, lines 3-10; edited in Frenkel, M.,
The Compassionate and Benevolent: The Leading Elite in the Jewish Community of Ale-
xandria in the Middle Ages, (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 2006, doc. 16; Goitein’s edition also
published on-line by the PGP; see also idem, Mediterranean Society, 4, 238-39 (partial
translation), 437 footnote 92 (on the dating).
60 The words in italics in the translation (in quotation marks below) are in Hebrew.
Fa-tafa

ala al-a
ra al-mun‘im[a ... ] li-mamlkih ‘ashara ardib [qam] wa-ya‘rifu
al[-shaykh inna] al-mamlk li-[...] an yusallimahu fa-inna l-mamlk [mu]lif kulla sa-
natin bay[t]uhu frighun m fhi qam ma‘a kuthrat ‘’ilatihi wa-atb‘ihi wa-l-lhu
ta‘(l) “hiqdim refu’a la-makka” wa-mann ‘al al-khdim bi-iin‘ih wa-iftiqdih.
ENA NS 19.10, verso, lines 5-8; see Goitein’s explanation of these lines, Mediterranean
Society, 2, 437 footnote 100.at the fact that in Judaeo-Arabic the word tended to be used princi-
pally in the context of requests. While this writer, understanding the
roots of the term, connects human patronage with the divine sort,
most of the other Judaeo-Arabic letters in which I have found it were
evidently unaware of those roots and used the word instead in a ste-
reotyped and formulaic fashion.
Indeed, apart from the single example I cited above, among the
thousands of documents I have searched, iin‘ appears only as a
piece of motivational rhetoric intended to convince the reader to per-
form some favour for the writer. In writing to the magnate Nahray b.
Nissim, the trader Malia
 b. Yehuda of Alexandria asks for help re-
trieving some money that his associates in Fustat still owed him, and
phrases his request this way: “you would do me a good deed (of the
kind that God rewards; mathwaba), and truly I would be among those
who thank you, and verily you would bestow kindness on me
(wa-la-yaani‘n), and you would proffer your benefaction (jaml)t o
me as you have proffered your benefaction and favour (f
l) on oth-
ers.” 61 The term had, it appears, been debased to the point where it
served in formulaic contexts and meant, simply, conferring a favour.
Those contexts were principally petitions for charity and other
written requests for aid. Many of them are addressed to the heads of
the Jews (ru’as’ al-yahd or negidim) of Egypt and Syria, a signifi-
cant fact since, like petitions to the Fatimid chancery, letters to
negidim followed increasingly stereotyped formulae that were not un-
related to chancery formulae themselves. One of the major responsi-
bilities of the negidim was tending to the poor and needy and granting
them aid, and they did so not merely as representatives of the commu-
nity in the abstract, but as private individuals. We saw a hint of this
tendency toward personal relationships earlier, when the desperate
Ye
ezqel b. Ibrh	m found the nagid Mevorakh b. Se‘adya occupied
with khidmat al-suln and lodged his request for help with Ab
‘ImrnM s b. Ab	 l-ayy instead. The abundant evidence the
Geniza has preserved relating to private charity reflects the individual
quality of leadership outside the public one of the communal dole, a
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61 Wa-ya‘mil fiyya mathwaba wa-la-nakn lahu min ba‘
 al-shkirn wa-la-yaani‘n
wa-li-yasbiq jamlahu ‘alayya ka-m sabaqa jamlahu wa-f
lahu ‘al ghayr. T-S 10 J
12.21, in Judaeo-Arabic, right margin, lines 6-11; published in Gil, In the Kingdom of
Ishmael, doc. 762; Goitein’s edition also published on-line by the PGP.phenomenon that can be explained through the very dynamics of pa-
tronage under discussion here: the nagid was personally responsible
for individual members of the community. 62 Indeed, even the highest
rulers bestowed public works not in the name of the state but as indi-
viduals, and their subjects were expected to express their gratitude
—and did so— not to an abstract state but to the individual donor. 63
But even when petitions were addressed to the nagid in a private
capacity, most of those that came from the poor were penned by pro-
fessional scribes who worked on behalf of the Jewish community as a
collectivity; and scribes knew that requests for patronage were more
effective when they followed a certain protocol. They used and re-
used phrases built around iin‘; this word had entered the range of
specialized and stylized vocabulary and become part of the scribe’s
rhetorical arsenal. In short, it assumed a technical meaning in
Judaeo-Arabic, one illustrated by the following examples.
An undated petition for help from the eleventh or twelfth century,
written in a calligraphic, surely professional, hand (perhaps that of a
legal court scribe), asked its recipient (perhaps a judge in another rab-
binical court) to help the bearer sell a quantity of cheese; “and may he
treat him according to the liberality (iin‘ihi) that is known among
everyone.” 64 Likewise, a woman petitioned the ra’s al-yahd
Shemu’el b. ananya (1140-59) to help her husband pay the jizya,
which he had been imprisoned for avoiding; the family was now
starving, and the scribe who wrote a petition on her behalf asked that
the nagid honor her request “out of kindness (f iin‘)” to herself
and her children. 65
Nor is it merely the handwriting of scribes that suggests that
iin‘ had entered the store of terms commonly used among profes-
sionals. Their petitions use other formulaic phrases borrowed from
the pool of rhetoric normally found in appeals to the Fatimid chan-
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62 On the nagid’s role as helper of the poor, see Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 2,
36-38; on the Jewish poor and the distinction between public and private charity, see
Cohen, Poverty and Charity, 189-242; see also 174-88.
63 Goitein, S.D., “Minority Selfrule and Government Control in Islam,” Studia Isla-
mica, 31 (1970), 102; Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 77-78.
64 Wa-yaf‘al ma‘ahu asab iin‘ihi al-ma‘rf ma‘a kull aad. T-S 10 J 9.17, in Ju-
daeo-Arabic, lines 9-10; Goitein’s edition published on-line by the PGP.
65 F iin‘ al-‘abda wa-aflih (on the term ‘abd in these petitions, see below).
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, Center for Advanced Judaic Studies Library,
Halper 379, in Judaeo-Arabic; line 12. Goitein’s edition published on-line by the PGP.cery. When the pauper Ibrh	m of Sunb wrote to the head of the
Jewish community in Fustat for help for his family, the provincial
scribe writing on his behalf styled him “the slave” (al-‘abd) and the
recipient “your excellency the nagid”( hadrat ha-negidut in Hebrew,
echoing the Arabic honorific al-a
ra, the Presence). He introduced
the main body of the request with another standard marker in chan-
cery petitions, the phrase “the slave (...) makes it known to his excel-
lency,” 66 and employed the following piece of rhetoric in closing:
“How fitting it would be for you to confer protection (iin‘)o nm e
and show mercy to me and my children (m awlh f iin‘ihi
wa-l-r’fa lahu wa-li-aflihi).” 67 The latter phrase reads as lofty, but
in fact it is a common one, mechanical and stereotyped. It appears
nearly verbatim in another petition, this one from the widow of a can-
tor named Ben Na
man to the ra’s al-yahd Malia
 ha-Kohen b.
Shelomo (1127-39), requesting mediation of a conflict with her late
husband’s son by a previous marriage and his sister, who had refused
to grant her the share of the family apartment that her husband had
bequeathed to her. The scribe who wrote the petition adopted the stan-
dard mise-en-page of chancery petitions, writing the names of the pe-
titioner and the addressee in the upper left corner. He, too, styled her
“the slave” and styled the nagid “your excellency the ga’on”( hadrat
ha-ge’onut), and engaged the rhetoric of both ni‘ma and iin‘: the
slave “wishes that (the nagid) would, in his benefaction (min
in‘mih), look upon me with a merciful eye”; and he adds, “how fit-
ting it would be for you to confer protection (iin‘) on the slave and
her son (fa-m awlh f iin‘ al-‘abda wa-waladih).” The petition
ends, likewise, with phrases taken nearly verbatim from the formulae
that closed Fatimid chancery petitions: “to you,” in this case the
nagid, “belongs the lofty decision in this matter (wa-lah ‘al al-ra’
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66 ‘Abd hadrat ha-negidut, takn misratuhu le-nea, yunh il smh (“the slave of
his excellency the nagid, may his rule be established forever, informs his excellency”).
Cambridge University Library, Or. 1081 J 10, in Hebrew and Judaeo-Arabic, line 3;
Mark R. Cohen’s edition published on-line by the PGP.
67 Or. 1081 J 10, lines 9-11. In support of the notion that this line represents mere
formulary, cf. the petition of 1151 to the Fatimid vizier Ibn Salr (served under al-fir,
1149-58), from Jews whose deceased merchant father’s property had been impounded,
T-S 13 J 20.5, ed. Khan, Arabic Legal and Administrative Documents, doc. 79, verso,
margin, lines 1-2: ra’fatan lahum wa-isnan ‘alayhum. By the Ayyubid period, these
terms had become metonyms for the name of the sultan, who in a petition is styled
ra’fatuhu wa-isnuhu: T-S H 15.62, ed. ibidem, doc. 89, 370 n.º 1.f dhlik).” 68 It is not merely that the genre of the petition and some of
its stylistic features had entered the common koine of scribes outside
the chancery; the rhetoric of patronage had been frozen and imported
to a context outside the court. Iin‘, for its part, was now a
code-word used in requesting favours of potential patrons. The use of
the grammatical superlative awl, “most fitting,” from the same root
as wal’, patronage, suggests that the phrase was a fossilized remnant
of a context in which wal’ and iin‘ described living and breathing
structure of human relationships and had now become ossified as for-
mal rhetoric. That even a scribe from the provincial town of Sunb
knew the phrase demonstrates the reach of the vocabulary of liberal-
ity and its transformation into a broadly used code.
Iin‘ also assumed shades of the other common words used in
lodging appeals, such as khidma. A man in al-Ma
alla in the Nile
Delta who was being actively pursued by the Ayyubid controller of
revenue wrote a desperate letter to an old friend in Fustat asking him
to obtain a letter from Shams al-D	n, the director of revenue, register-
ing him as absent and thus enabling him to avoid paying legitimately;
he ended his plea with the phrases: “By all that is due (our) neighbor-
liness and good rearing (together; wa-aqq al-jiwr wa-l-tarbiya),
confer this on me (iani‘n) for the sake of God, may He be exalted,
and it shall count for you as a treasure (i.e., a reward in the final reck-
oning; yakn laka dhakhra).” In this letter, iin‘ appears, like
khidma, to denote a service that served both the giver and the re-
ceiver. Indeed, the man closes his letter by saying, “I am in God’s
keep and yours (wa-an f asab allh wa-asabika).” 69
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68 Tashtah min in‘mih l-naar ilayh bi-‘ayn al-rama (lines 7-8); line 18-19. T-S
13 J 13.6, in Hebrew and Judaeo-Arabic; edited in Cohen, M.R., “Four Judaeo-Arabic
Petitions of the Poor from the Cairo Geniza,” JSAI, 24 (2000), 459-64; translated to En-
glish in idem, Voice of the Poor, doc. 48 (I have departed slightly from his translation);
for the details of the case and an earlier petition from the same widow (T-S 10 J 16.4),
see ibidem, doc. 47. The usual closing formula of petitions to Fatimid caliphs is li-maw-
lan al-ra’y al-‘l (or: ‘l l-ra’y) f dhlika, with variants attested and different formu-
lae for rulers below the rank of caliph; see Khan, Arabic Legal and Adminsitrative Docu-
ments, 314-16. It is thus particularly interesting that the caliphal formula was chosen
here, with the exception of the honorific mawln (the pronoun refers instead to the ear-
lier Hebrew honorific hadra).
69 Cambridge University Library, Or. 1081 J 13, in Judaeo-Arabic, right margin.
Goitein’s edition published on-line by the PGP; see the partial translation in idem, Medi-
terranean Society, 2, 382 (which omits the closing formulae).Iin‘’s eventual reduction to a term tantamount merely to “fa-
vour” appears most clearly in a thirteenth-century letter from Ab
l-Majd ‘Uzzi’el of Dam	ra who, having been offered a post as teacher
in Minyat Zifta by the muqaddam (judge and local headman) of
Minyat Ghamr, Moshe b. Pera
ya, wrote to inform the latter that he
would take up the position only when he was certain that the current
teacher had departed from the town and only if the Jewish community
sent him an offer in writing. Despite these cold-blooded negotiating
tactics, he opens his letter with extravagant thanks for the offer, ac-
knowledging “your kindness (jaml), benefit (isn), and favour
(iin‘) for all your servants (khuddm).” 70 Iin‘ appears here as
one in a string of terms for kindnesses and favours, an equivalence
that suggests that it had lost its specificity as a term of patronage, and
that it could not adequately express the sense of “favour” without the
help of synonyms.
How clearly do these debased usages of iin‘ reflect earlier ones
less debased that bespeak more clearly the affective ties between peo-
ple? Were it not for their appearance in petitions, I might have said
not very clearly. But the link with courtly procedure suggests that,
when petitions and, ultimately, letters came to reflect courtly vocabu-
lary in ossified form, the link to the court was tangible rather than
merely imitative —even if by now the debased usages were merely
utilitarian rhetoric designed to produce results. They could not have
been as effective or as widely used if they did not conjure up some-
thing; indeed, the prevalence of imitations demonstrates the impor-
tance of the original item.
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70 T-S 12.360, in Judaeo-Arabic, lines 8-10; he goes on to thank “the Creator for his
good health, may God make eternal his benefaction (ni‘ma) and strengthen the force of
his judgments and preserve him for his people”: wa-qabbalahu mamlkuh qabl
al-wuqf ‘alayhi wa-i‘tarafa bi-jamlih wa-isnih wa-iin‘ih li-kull khuddmih
wa-shukr al-khliq ‘al ‘fiyatih allh yudm ‘alayhi ni‘matahu wa-ayyadah min
shar‘atihi wa-yubqh li-ummatihi. Goitein’s edition published on-line by the PGP. On
the judge, the town, and teachers’ reluctance to infringe on one another’s posts, see idem,
Mediterranean Society, 2, 49, 187.Patronage and Loyalty
Remarkably given all this, the range of terms used to describe pa-
tronage and loyalty were not mere rhetorical fossils but retained tan-
gible relationships to the social world from which they came.
Nya
The words for loyalty and other sorts of obligations in these
sources are numerous, beginning with sincerity of intention (nya)
and extending to more binding ties such as pacts and oaths (‘uhd),
and ending in the tie of patronage itself (dhimm). For example, when
the ga’on of the Jerusalem yeshiva, Dani’el b. ‘Azarya (1051-62),
wrote to a Jewish courtier in Fustat and thanked him for a copy of a
rescript (ruq‘a, possibly his rescript of investiture as ga’on) from the
chancery of the Fatimid caliph al-Mustanir (1036-94), he wrote: “I
understood what you mentioned on the matter of the edict (ruq‘a)
which our lord (mawln —the caliph) delivered to you, may God
prolong his days, exalt his fortune, and destroy his foes, his enemies,
and those who wish him evil. And I said many pious (li) prayers for
his Presence (the caliph), since I am obligated to him (mulzimuhu),
night and day, since he has lavished on me his benefactions and fa-
vours (asabam qad ghamuran min isnih wa-naw’ilih).” 71 In
thanking not just his courtier ally but the caliph himself, the ga’on re-
veals that he considered his relationship to the caliph as a personal
one, and no less the binding for it. As for the courtier who served as
intermediary, he describes him as, “after God, may he be praised, a
source of this ni‘ma, since by your exalted station (jh) and good in-
tention (usn al-nya), fortune has come to me before this exalted per-
sonage.” 72 “Good intention” (usn al-nya) means something like
loyalty; his courtier ally had exchanged two social assets, his high sta-
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71 T-S 24.56, in Judaeo-Arabic, verso, lines 3-6; published in Goitein, S.D., “Dani’el
b. ‘Azarya, nasi ve-ga’on: Berurim u-mismakhim 
adashim,” (Hebrew), Shalem, 2
(1975-76), 84-89; idem, Palestinian Jewry, 163-68. See also idem, Mediterranean So-
ciety, 2, 527, footnote 35; 5, 384 (at footnote 60); 5, 321 (at footnote 46). Also published
in Gil, Palestine, doc. 355; see ibidem, secs. 779 and 889. Both identify the author based
on handwriting and the recipient based on context.
72 T-S 24.56, verso, lines 7-9. See also verso, line 39, where he further notes the obli-
gation to render thanks for the in‘m of a certain colleague.tion and his devotion to Dani’el b. ‘Azarya, to acquire this benefac-
tion, and the latter did not hesitate to spell out the calculus of benefit.
Intention (nya) appears frequently in similar constructions in the
sources, particularly in phrases such as usn al-nya and ikhl
al-nya, good or sincere intentions. According to the history of ‘Abd
al-Ra
mn b. al-Jawz	 (d. 1200), the Abbasid caliph al-Q’im
(1031-75) swore a pact of loyalty (mthq, ‘ahd) to his Buyid vizier
Jall al-Dawla in which he promised to “continue in sincerity of in-
tention and friendship (ikhl al-nya wa-l-af)” toward him, that is,
in loyalty. The oath explicitly called on God as witness and, further,
invoked the covenant between God and his believers, implying the
equivalency between the two pacts and the basis of the human one in
the divine one. 73 Good intention or nya was a necessary prerequisite
to agreeing to any covenant.
‘Ahd
Despite the complications of oaths in Jewish law and their con-
comitant avoidance of them, Jews were well aware of the importance
of nya even in the absence of vows. In the letter I quoted above from
Hayya b. Sherira of Baghdad to his protégé Sahln b. Avraham in
Fustat, warning him of the schemes of his political enemies and
promising to protect him, Hayya explains that one of his supporters
has already informed him “to whom we should write among those
who have sincere intentions toward you (muniika) so that we can
thank them, and to whom we should write among your adversaries so
that we can make peace between you and them.” 74 More than the
economy of thanks for loyalty that the ga’on promises Sahln’s sup-
porters, he notes that his loyalists are those whose intentions toward
him are sincere. He also describes his obligation toward Sahlnb .
Avraham as an ‘ahd, a pact or an obligation.
Hayya’s use of these idioms of patronage is noteworthy given that
he wrote from Baghdad and shared them with the Buyid learned elite.
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73 Ibn al-Jawz	, al-Muntaam f trkh al-mulk wa-l-umam, Hyderabad, 1357-59;
repr. Beirut, 1960, 6-8, 6, 343, quoted in Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 56. On
nya see further ibidem, 65-67.
74 Mosseri Ia 5 (L 2).Nor was he the only ga’on of Baghdad to use them. His contemporary
Shemu’el b. ofni (998-1013) was equally conversant in the lan-
guage of loyalty, as when he wrote to an ally in Fustat in 998 asking
him to persuade the wealthy merchants there into sending more fre-
quent letters and, thus, more frequent donations to his yeshiva. He
singled out one man for particular praise, a Persian Qaraite named
Ab Sulaymn David b. Bapshd, who had rendered some sort of ser-
vice to the yeshiva, whether in banking or transportation of funds or
in outright donations we do not know (Qaraites are attested in all
these roles, despite the paradox their assistance to rabbinic institu-
tions appears to suggest). 75 “Please thank David b. Bapshdo nm y
behalf, may God help him,” Shemu’el b. ofni wrote, “since he has
evinced toward me nothing but kindness and benefited me and been
loyal to me (innahu awln kull jaml wa-nafa‘an wa-barran). Let
him know of the esteem (in which I hold) his loyalty (mawqi‘a
birrihi).” 76 Birr is yet another amphibolous term, conveying either
side of a patronage relationship: it can mean either benefaction or rev-
erence, a polarity I have attempted to render by translating it as loy-
alty. 77
The covenantal idiom of ‘ahd was used west of Baghdad, too. An
otherwise unknown rabbinical teacher in Alexandria named Dani’el
b. Ya‘aqov wrote to the equally unknown Yi
aq ha-Kohen b. Yehuda
al-Dimashq	 asking him to send greetings to a certain Sa‘d al-Mulk
—judging by his title, a courtier, bureaucrat, tax-farmer, or other
functionary working for the Ayyubids (the letter is undated, but the ti-
tle is attested in other early Ayyubid letters). 78 “I ask you to go to the
salon in which Suhayl al-ibyn entertains,” Dani’el b. Ya‘aqov
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75 For details on Qaraite alliances with the ge’onim of Baghdad and Jerusalem in the
eleventh century, see Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of Community, chapters 5 and 6.
76 T-S 8 J 39.9, in Judaeo-Arabic; published in Goitein, “Letter of the Gaon Samuel
b. ofni, Dated 998, and its Implications for the Biography of the Spanish Poet Isaac b.
Khalfon,” (Hebrew), Tarbi, 49 (1979-80), 199-201; and Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael,
doc. 48.
77 See also T-S 24.27v, lines 23-37, translated in Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 5,
82; see also ibidem, 528 footnote 165.
78 E.g., Bodl MS Heb. d 66.34, line 20, ed. Goitein, Palestinian Jewry, 319-20; ENA
NS 19.31, verso, line 9, Goitein’s edition published on-line by the PGP; T-S 13 J 20.6,
line 17, Goitein’s edition published on-line by the PGP; T-S 12.425, verso, address
(El‘azar b. Yehudah b. El‘azar ha-Kohen, known as Sa‘d al-Mulk), Goitein’s edition pu-
blished on-line by the PGP; T-S NS 321.54, line 4, Goitein’s edition published on-line by
the PGP. For the dating, see idem, Mediterranean Society, 2, 356; 3, 358.wrote, “and kiss the hand of Sa‘d al-Mulk for me. Single him out
for my greetings and ask him where the covenant (‘ahd) between
him and me (has gone; m hdha al-‘ahd alldh kna bayn
wa-baynahu).” 79 He goes on to explain that he had sent Sa‘d al-Mulk
numerous letters but heard reply to not a single one of them; his invo-
cation of the covenant of loyalty (‘ahd) between them may have been
mere hyperbole in view of his eagerness for a reply, but it may also
have reflected the history the two men shared and some genuine bond
between them.
Dhimm
The covenantal imagery invoked through the word ‘ahd, it seems,
applied to men nearly equal in station, while the rhetoric of iin‘ re-
flected the steep heights of hierarchy that petitions were meant to tra-
verse. But when the obligation incurred between two men reflected a
more mildly or temporarily hierarchical arrangement, the term of
choice was dhimm. Sam
nb .D wd al-Siqill	, a Jewish merchant
from Ifr	qiya of the early eleventh century, wrote to the mercantile
magnate Ysuf b. ‘Awkal explaining that he had earned no profit on a
shipment of brazilwood that Ibn ‘Awkal had sent. “I did this,” he ex-
plained, “because of your patronage (dhimmika) and because you
aid me with your high position (jh) with regard to what I send you at
my expense”: he was willing to take a loss in doing business on Ibn
‘Awkal’s behalf because he profited from the arrangement in other
ways, acknowledgement that the affective bonds between men could
be parlayed into economic and political capital. 80
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79 Wa-as’alaka tam
 il al-q‘a alldh yaqr fh Suhayl al-ibyn wa-tuqabbil
‘ann yad Sa‘d al-Mulk wa-takhuuhu salm wa-taql lahu m hdha l-‘ahd alldh
kna bayn wa-baynahu wa-khauhu ma‘ bihi wa-ta‘arifuhu katabtu ilayhi ‘iddat kutub
wa-lam asma‘ li-wid minh jawb. T-S 10 J 13.23, in Judaeo-Arabic, lines 12-17; Goi-
tein’s edition published on-line by the PGP. Salon: q‘a; cf. idem, Mediterranean So-
ciety, 4, 69-70 (the translation of “schoolhouse” suggested there does not fit the context).
80 Fa‘altu dhlik li-dhimmika ‘ind wa-m tu‘ayyinun bihi bi-jhika f m ba‘athtu
bihi ilayka li-khat, Budapest, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Kaufmann Collec-
tion, 13, line 6; published by Goitein, “The Jewish Trade in the Mediterranean at the Be-
ginning of the 11th Century, from the Archives of Ibn ‘Awkal Family,” (Hebrew), Tar-
bi, 37 (1968), 64-66 (footnote 16); Goitein’s corrected edition published on-line by the
PGP. See also further comments on this letter as a reflection of informal cooperationIn Praise of Form
The similarities and differences between court-sponsored and doc-
umentary sources in their uses of the idioms of patronage suggest sev-
eral conclusions.
First, the comparison sheds light on the relationship between Jews
and the empire that ruled them, in terms of both substance and style.
Crone contends that the Abbasids failed to convince anyone outside
the immediate confines of Baghdad of the dynasty’s ideological
programme. 81 My material suggests otherwise: Jews engaged wil-
lingly and sincerely in the discourse of patronage that received its
characteristic shape at the Abbasid court. Jewish leaders embraced
imperial rule since it offered them, too, a means of self-legitimation.
This is by no means to suggest, in simplistic fashion, that the Jews
merely imitated what the few of them learned who were fortunate
enough to gain appointments at court. Jews can be said to have imi-
tated courtly manners no more than they can be said to have imitated
the Arabic speech and literature that was their native and, in most
cases, only means of communication. On the contrary: the idioms
were theirs, and the degree to which they used the vocabulary of pa-
tronage and loyalty reflects the degree to which it pervaded the entire
society, or at least that urban and seaborne part of it reflected in the
Geniza. This included not merely those literate enough to write, but
those with enough access to the literate few that they could have doc-
uments written for them. Idioms of patronage allowed Jews to con-
duct business and politics, and, as suggested by the letters of the
ge’onim who headed the rabbinic academies to which most Jews of-
fered their allegiance, had a hand in enabling rabbinic Judaism to be-
come and remain the hegemonic form of the religion throughout the
Middle Ages. That is to say: only to the extent that Jewish leaders
adopted the forms and styles of the political relationships I have dis-
cussed above could they hope to amass and retain followers.
Like writing itself, then, idioms of patronage constituted a linguis-
tic technology whose effect was to render its users powerful, and to
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(mu‘mala) and reciprocity of service among traders in Stillman, N.A., “The Eleventh
Century Merchant House of Ibn ‘Awkal (A Geniza Study),” Journal of the Economic and
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81 Crone, Slaves on Horses, 73.produce binding ties. This suggests that the effects of imperial rule on
religious minorities, though pervasive, could have unexpected conse-
quences, even if those consequences varied considerably depending
on one’s analytical framework: in this case, empire itself allowed the
Jewish diaspora to spread in unprecedented fashion and, despite such
wide geographic dispersion, to experience a sense of unity —one cen-
tered, in part, on Baghdad or the idea of it. Why this was especially
true after the political decline of the Abbasid capital in the tenth cen-
tury— why the apotheosis of the geonim of Baghdad in Jewish litera-
ture postdated the decline of Baghdad in political and economic real-
ity —is a question for another study.
Second, the comparisons I have drawn above between courtly
and non-courtly uses of the idioms of patronage suggest that one
might fruitfully reconsider the respective roles of formalism and
informalism in the medieval Near East. Patronage, which began as a
formal legal and political institution, softened and spread to become
the loose form of patronage reflected in the Geniza sources; mean-
while some of the language used to express ties of patronage, such as
iin‘, began informally enough among Abbasid and Buwayhid
functionaries but hardened to become formal rhetoric invoked in the
most stereotyped way.
The combination of linguistic formalism with political infor-
malism is a particularly intriguing one, because it suggests something
about the way language drives human relationships. The point is per-
haps most fruitfully made by comparing medieval political relation-
ships with modern ones. Industrialized societies with bureaucratic
states tend to lead to relations among groups that are formal, corpora-
tive, legalized, and bureaucratized, and to relations between individu-
als that are informal and understood as the product of choice and af-
fect. Medieval politics, by contrast, rested on formal ties between
individuals while tending to repel fixed and formal bonds among
groups.
An analogous point can be made about the use of formulae in writ-
ten documentation; it was, in fact, made brilliantly if abstrusely by
John Wansbrough. 82 When one considers chancery practice, letter
writing, and the composition of legal documents, that is, diplomatic,
broadly across the Mediterranean basin, it seems that precisely the el-
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of language, choice alphabet as a function of language, and the use of
particular phrases, were in fact the most flexible in practice. Jews
wrote Arabic mainly in Hebrew characters; but on occasion they
wrote Hebrew, and on still other occasions, Hebrew in Arabic charac-
ters and Arabic in Arabic characters. Likewise, scribes and diplomats
used what worked to render the documents they wrote legally and po-
litically binding, and the documents they wrote suggest that choice of
language and alphabet were less important than conveying a particu-
lar kind of phrase that might have the desired effect. The large num-
ber of calques and outright stylistic thefts one finds in legal docu-
ments attest that scribes were hardly above domesticating an entirely
foreign tradition if this won them the results they sought: legal
enforceability. At the same time, precisely those features of docu-
ments that we might imagine to have varied across legal and cultural
traditions —form (which we see as being standard within a particular
cultural setting) and instrumental force (which we see as a mere acci-
dent of local enforcement)— appear with remarkable consistency
across vastly different legal, political, and literary traditions.
I can hardly do Wansbrough’s thesis justice in the limited space at
my disposal, but I mention it here to call attention to the broader con-
clusions one might draw from the remarkable consistency with which
the relationships I have discussed recur in vastly differing written ma-
terial, and with which the specific idioms that one might imagine
flourished only in particular contexts in fact surpassed the boundaries
of the court and served political functions in other contexts in which
men and women, for varying purposes, chose to cultivate relation-
ships across social hierarchies.
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